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1 Introductory observations: the South African miracle (?) 
Growing up as one of the privileged white minority in apartheid South Africa, I was taught 
that democracy for all and policies aimed at the integration of the various population groups 
would toll the bell for the death of my future and that of my group. I lived to witness the ad-
vent of these once dreaded eventualities and today I do not hesitate to join Nelson Mandela in 
describing South Africa’s transition to democracy as a “small miracle”.1 This does not mean 
that the said transition was painless or bloodless, but when it came to the crunch we South Af-
ricans steered clear of the catastrophic showdown, the Armageddon, that “informed observ-
ers” had for many years predicted was lying in store for us. Those who suffered and made 
sacrifices actively to resist apartheid, thus did so for what eventually turned out to be a nego-
tiated political settlement embodied in two successive constitutions - the transitional Constitu-
tion of 19932 and the “final” Constitution of 19963 - which many believe count among the 
most progressive constitutional texts in the modern world. 
This paper does not focus on South Africa’s “small miracle” as such, but on the constitutional 
and legal means that have been designed to address issues associated with the integration of 
diverse cultures in a pluralistic society, capitalising on the good start we had. We may not lose 
sight of the “small miracle” for as Anton Rupert, one of South Africa’s foremost business per-
sonalities, always reminds us: “(S)he who does not believe in miracles is no realist!” This 
does not warrant blind euphoria, however, and after we have rightly breathed our sighs of re-
lief, realism enjoins us to ask: is there, in the long run, reason for optimism about an integra-
tion of diverse population and interest groups that will sustain the vital endeavour of nation 
building in South Africa? 
My assessment of the situation is informed with considered (and not merely cautious) opti-
mism. The glass of nation building in South Africa is certainly not full (yet) – and will for 
quite some time not be full – but in my measured estimation it is half full and not half empty. 
Optimism is a state of mind, yes, but it is, from time to time, also borne out by empirical evi-
dence. A recent survey, significantly entitled Truth – Yes, Reconciliation – Maybe: South Af-
                                                 
1 Cf eg Ralph Lawrence “Introduction. From Soweto to Codesa” in Steven Friedman and Doreen 
Atkinson eds The South African Review 7. The Small Miracle. South Africa’s negotiated Settle-
ment 1-12 (Johannesburg Ravan Press 1994) 1. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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ricans Judge the Truth and Reconciliation Process,4 for instance, shows that most South Afri-
cans have come to accept that apartheid was a crime against humanity. This includes a major-
ity among formerly privileged (white) South Africans who, by holding this view, acknowl-
edges the reality of the suffering of the other(s) under apartheid. On the question of racial rec-
onciliation there is ambivalence, however. On the one hand, large majorities of South Afri-
cans of every race reject the view that South Africa would have been better off if there were 
no people of other races in the country – and this is encouraging. On the other hand, most 
South Africans still find it difficult to understand people of other races and therefore continue 
to subscribe to ingrained racial stereotypes. This lack of understanding of the other(s) seems 
to induce racially hostile attitudes among black people in particular – probably not because of 
inherent racism, but because of a lack of interaction with others (and with whites in particu-
lar). As I said, the glass is not full…yet. 
The last mentioned finding of the survey emphasises that knowledge and an active acknowl-
edgement of the otherness of the other(s) is necessary to start recruiting compatriots from 
mostly dissimilar backgrounds for operation nation building. Mobilisation can only start once 
the recruits are convinced that it is worthwhile for members of the South African nation to 
celebrate their intra-national diversity. This, of course, is very much an attitudinal issue, but 
even the most positive attitudes can come to naught if not backed (and preferably also encour-
aged) by institutional (in casu legal and constitutional) means. I shall next evaluate some ex-
amples of such means, sticking to my last as a legal and constitutional scholar by briefly ana-
lysing some relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and assessing trends in the case 
law dealing with these provisions. I cannot paint a full picture simply because the landscape is 
too vast. When next I explain how I understand the key terms “culture” and “integration” in 
the title of this paper, I shall also indicate how I am going to limit the scope of the paper. 
2 “Culture” and various (possible) modes of “integration” 
“Culture”, in its broadest signification, is a collective noun for all forms of expressing the 
multifarious facets of being human, and the term therefore also alludes to various individuals’, 
groups’ and communities’ political and economic situation in society. In a narrower sense 
“culture” is often meant to refer to people’s ethnic identity which, in its turn, is associable 
with more immediate (and I may even venture to say more intimate) forms of expressing their 
humanness in day-to-day life. This brings us in the vicinity of issues dealing with the free use 
of one’s mother tongue; the free exercise of one’s religious and other beliefs; marriage, family 
life and the upbringing and education of one’s children; et cetera. As well as signifying the 
accommodation of ethnic diversity, the integration of dissimilar cultures in South Africa thus 
also has to do with, for instance, both the former oppressors and the formerly oppressed com-
ing to terms with the past, and with the equitable distribution of material means. The constitu-
tional and legal means that have been put in place to aid a process of dealing with the past and 
with the equitable distribution of material means, therefore also count among the institutional 
means aimed at furthering the integration of different cultures in South Africa. An institution-
alised truth and reconciliation process based on a constitutional compromise5 was put into op-
                                                 
4 James L Gibson and Helen Macdonald Truth – Yes, Reconciliation – Maybe: South Africans Judge 
the Truth and Reconciliation Process Research Report, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 
(Rondebosch Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 2001). 
5 This compromise was embodied in a most unusual Postamble to South Africa’s transitional Con-
stitution. 
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eration through and conducted in accordance with legislation designed for this particular pur-
pose.6 The “final” South African Constitution also explicitly guarantees access (but not out-
and-out entitlement) to rights conducive to the improvement of the fate of disadvantaged and 
marginalized sections of the population, but the courts have generally speaking tended to pro-
ceed (over-)cautiously in giving effect to these constitutional guarantees.7 
It cannot be said with certainty yet whether constitutional and legislative provision for na-
tional reconciliation and socio-economic empowerment will bear the desired fruit. The survey 
I referred to earlier indicates that South Africans can certainly not rest on their laurels as far as 
national reconciliation is concerned. The prosperity gap between the relatively well-to-do 
20% and the poor 80% of the population has moreover not really been narrowing since the 
advent of full democracy. What has changed, though, is that the top 20% that used to be 
overwhelmingly white is now about 50% black. I mention the uncertainty about success in the 
areas of national reconciliation and socio-economic empowerment only in passing, for even 
though they are cultural issues and therefore within the untruncated scope of the topic under 
discussion, they are areas too vast to traverse in this paper. I can only focus on constitutional 
and legal measures designed to foster cultural integration in the narrower, ethnic sense. The 
success of cultural integration in this narrower sense will nonetheless depend largely on how 
successful national reconciliation and economic empowerment are going to be. 
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary “integration” can inter alia mean “the intermix-
ing of persons previously segregated”, but when I speak of the integration of various sections 
of the South African population I do not simply mean an intermixing of people for the sake of 
mingling them or stirring them together in a melting pot. I have in mind the consolidation of a 
diversity of people for the sake of nation building in a manner that will ensure their equal par-
ticipation in or membership of society.8 
3 Explicit constitutional protection for language and culture 
The South African Constitution lends generous protection to language and culture. Section 6 
of the Constitution recognises no less than eleven official languages. They are, in the order 
listed in section 6(1), Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, 
English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu. Section 6(2) recognises that the indigenous black 
languages previously enjoyed but a diminished status and the section therefore enjoins the 
state to take “practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these 
languages”. According to section 6(3) government in the various spheres9 may use any par-
ticular official languages for governmental purposes, taking into account usage, practicality, 
expense, regional circumstances and the balance of the needs and preferences of the popula-
tion it serves. The national and provincial governments must, however, use at least two offi-
cial languages. They must further, according to section 4, regulate and monitor their use of of-
ficial languages in such a way that all official languages enjoy parity and esteem and be 
                                                 
6 Namely the Promotion of National Unity Act 34 of 1995. 
7 Cf eg Soobramoney v. Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1997 12 BCLR. 1696 (CC); Grootboom 
v Oostenburg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C); Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 11 
BCLR 1235 (CC). 
8 According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary “to integrate” can also mean to “bring or come into 
equal participation in or membership of society”. 
9 “Government in the various spheres” is constitutional nomenclature for “government at various 
levels” or else “the various tiers of government”. 
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treated equitably. Section 6(5) calls into existence a Pan South African Language Board that 
must promote and create conditions for the development and use not only of all the official 
languages, but also of non-official languages such as the Khoi, Nama and San languages as 
well as sign language.10 
It could be said that the Constitution provides for an over-generous protection of the various 
languages. There is nothing wrong with the meticulous recognition of the equal status of vari-
ous languages, but the principled consistency and even-handedness in this area creates a 
minefield of practical problems and is, as a matter of fact, hardly sustainable in the day-to-day 
conduct of the state’s business. Increasingly, English is becoming an official lingua franca 
even though, in terms of its number of mother tongue speakers, it is only the fifth biggest lan-
guage in South Africa; geographically speaking it is not the most widely spoken language, 
and there is a substantial number of South Africans who cannot speak, read or write English. 
Be it as it may, the painstaking constitutional protection of South Africa’s various languages 
is part of the stuff of which the small miracle was made. For at least some time to come we 
will therefore have to find ways of negotiating the minefield of impracticalities caused by the 
exceptionally generous recognition of official languages. 
Section 30 of the Constitution entrenches everyone’s right to use the language and to partici-
pate in the cultural life of their choice. Section 31(1) then goes on to state that persons belong-
ing to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other 
members of that community - 
“(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and 
  (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society.” 
In the light of the cautiously worded introductory statement (“persons…may not be denied the 
right”) it is fair to conclude that section 31(1) recognises the rights mentioned in paragraphs 
(a) and (b) without guaranteeing them outright in the same way as most other constitutionally 
entrenched rights. This cautionary reining in of the section 31(1) protection must be read in 
conjunction with section 31(2) which is at pains to stipulate that section 31(1) rights may not 
be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. Section 
31(1)(b) nevertheless underwrites, with appreciable constitutional authenticity, communal and 
institutional manifestations of cultural, linguistic and religious rights. It is moreover singular 
in its explicit recognition of civil society as a social catalyst in the exercise of these rights. 
In the South African context the protection of cultural rights as ethnic rights is not uncontro-
versial – hence the guarded wording of section 31. Inspired by (amongst others) an ideology 
of Afrikaner nationalism, successive apartheid governments enforced racial separation in 
South Africa with an appeal to the professed aspiration of ethnic groups to practice their cul-
ture, to speak their language and to determine their own affairs. The country was balkanised 
in an effort, so it was maintained, to afford each “ethnic group” a right to self-determination 
in a territory of its own. And so “the policy of separate development” was born. The oppres-
sive manner in which this policy was implemented and the vastly unequal distribution of terri-
tory it authorised, showed it up for what it really was, namely a divide and rule strategy, de-
                                                 
10 Section 5(a). The Board must also promote and ensure respect for other minority languages (such 
as German, Greek, Gujatari, Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu) as well as other lan-
guages used for religious purposes (such as Arabic, Hebrew and Sanskrit). 
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signed to preserve white hegemony and privilege in about 87% of the South African territory. 
As during the 1980s separate development started showing signs of falter, some trenchant Af-
rikaner nationalists conceded that a territorially based self-determination for ethnic groups 
was attainable only if Afrikaners were to scale down claims to “their share” in the South Afri-
can territory. This concession gave rise to the notion of an “Afrikaner homeland” so modest 
that it would have made the principal architects of apartheid turn in their graves. 
Many Afrikaners of this persuasion abandoned the multi-party negotiations at which the proc-
ess of transition to democracy was agreed on. They also boycotted South Africa’s first democ-
ratic elections in 1994. The Freedom Front, a political party comprised for traditionalist Afri-
kaner nationalists, participated in the elections nonetheless and won seats in both the National 
Assembly and in provincial legislatures. The party therefore participated in the negotiations 
shaping the 1996 Constitution - with notable (albeit imperfect) success. They have the cau-
tiously worded sections 31 and, importantly, also 235 of the Constitution to show for their 
trouble. According to the latter provision the right of the South African people as a whole to 
self-determination “does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the 
notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and 
language heritage, within a territorial entity” in the Republic of South Africa. National legisla-
tion will, however, have to lend substance to this “group right”. Section 235 certainly does not 
proclaim an Afrikaner (or any other) homeland, but leaves room for Afrikaner (and other) tra-
ditionalists to contend for some form of territorially based self-determination. 
Sections 31 and 235 lend constitutional protection to the formation and organisation of groups 
on, amongst others, ethnic grounds. However, these provisions do not authorise secessionist 
behaviour: ethnic group formation may not undermine national unity, but at the same time na-
tional unity is also not imposed upon people. 
The protection of cultural rights based on ethnic affiliation can also be controversial because 
reliance on such rights can be (ab-)used to prolong a skewed distribution of privilege in cer-
tain areas. A particular language group in a given community may, for instance, claim the 
right to establish their own state supported school in circumstances where such action may 
deprive children from the disadvantaged section of that community of decent educational op-
portunities. Section 29(2) of the Constitution therefore caters for the provision of education in 
the language of someone’s choice, but does so quite cagily: 
“Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of 
their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably prac-
ticable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the 
state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium 
institutions, taking into account- 
(a) equity; 
(b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices.” 
So far there has been a paucity of in-depth case-law analyses on the application of the consti-
tutional provisions that safeguard language, culture and self-determination as envisaged in 
section 235, and the courts have made but oblique reference to the said guarantees. However, 
the South African Human Rights Commission, in its Finding in the Goudini Investigation, 
thought that it was not unconstitutional for a cultural, religious and linguistic association (as 
envisaged in section 31(1)(b)) to restrict its membership to persons of a particular faith - even 
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though this meant that persons who, but for their faith, would have qualified for membership 
of the association, are excluded from financial benefits that only members of the association 
enjoy. 
4 Guarantees of “a traditional way of life” 
It is not only a particular brand of Afrikaner nationalist who feels strongly about guarantees 
for ethnic rights. The advent of democracy has created room for all people in South Africa to 
celebrate their distinctive ethnic identities. This action may inter alia manifest in the quest of 
certain traditionalist communities to live their lives in accordance with what is believed to be 
their own (and their ancestors’) tried and tested way of life. Most South Africans committed 
to such traditionalist lifestyles are African blacks, but certain Khoi and San communities, the 
descendants of South Africa’s first nations in the truest sense of the word, have since 1994 
also been asserting their right to a lifestyle of their own and have done so in no uncertain 
terms. The kind of traditionalist community that I am referring to is mostly rural, remote, 
small-scale and close-knit, and “way of life” in such a community implies, amongst others, 
living under a localised form of (self-)government by traditional leaders and in accordance 
with a mostly unwritten code of customary law. Section 11 of the Black Administration Act11 
has traditionally allowed for the application of the customary or indigenous law of such 
(black) communities, administered by traditional leaders (or “chiefs and headmen” as they are 
called in the Act). Other courts of law may, however, also invoke customary law in disputes 
where both litigants live by it, but this is not admissible where, in the judgement of a modern-
ist, western-style court, customary law is in conflict with public policy or the rules of natural 
justice. Litigants to whose disputes customary law could be applied need not live within 
small-scale communities only and customary law is often invoked to settle the disputes of ur-
banised (black) people too and this could be problematic (as the example that will be dis-
cussed below clearly shows), because life in an urban suburb or township is lived within so-
cial structures (and assumes a dynamic) that differ fundamentally12 from those in a small-
scale, close-knit rural community. 
Section 211 of the Constitution recognises the institution, status and role of traditional leader-
ship according to customary law13 and, in broad terms, authorises traditional authorities to 
function by virtue of applicable legislation and customs (subject to possible amendment).14 
Section 211(3) enjoins courts to apply customary law “when that law is applicable”. Section 
211 as a whole is significantly and explicitly subject to the rest of the Constitution, however.  
When a court has to decide whether customary law ought to be applied in a particular case it 
could find itself on the horns of a dilemma, especially when the customary law considered for 
application seems to be “accepted law”, but is at the same time likely to encroach on funda-
mental rights entrenched in the Constitution or to compromise constitutional values. The case 
of Mthembu v Letsela and another that came before the Transvaal Provincial Division of the 
                                                 
11 38 of 1927. 
12 For a succinct exposition of the history and practice of recognising customary law in South Africa 
cf Lourens du Plessis An Introduction to Law 3rd edition (Kenwyn Juta 1999) 67-70. 
13 Section 211(1). 
14 Section 211(2). 
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High Court on two occasions15 and then went on appeal16 graphically illustrates this dilemma. 
Mr Letsela lived with Ms Mthembu and their five year old daughter, Tembi, in a house in an 
urban township. Mr Letsela owned the house under a 99-year leasehold. Mr Letsela’s parents 
lived with them. On 13 August 1993 Mr Letsela was gunned down by an unknown assailant 
and he died without leaving a will. The late Mr Letsela and Ms Mthembu were in the process 
of entering into a legally recognised marriage under African customary law and the deceased 
had already paid the first instalment of the customary dowry (or lobolo) to Ms Mthembu’s 
parents at the time he was killed. However, on trial the case was eventually (and with the con-
sent of the parties) decided on the basis that no legally recognisable customary union had been 
consummated between Mr Letsela and Ms Mthembu. 
The litigation between Ms Mthembu and the late Mr Letsela’s father dealt with the question 
whether the latter or Tembi was the late Mr Letsela’s heir. According to customary law Mr 
Letsela senior would be the heir. The customary law of intestate succession is premised on the 
principle of male primogeniture according to which the oldest male descendant inherits every-
thing, including the responsibility to maintain the deceased’s wife/wives and his children still 
finding themselves within the family. If there is no male descendant the deceased’s father in-
herits both his estate and his responsibilities. In casu the application of the customary law of 
intestate succession would therefore exclude Tembi as heir. The fact that she is an illegitimate 
child aggravated matters for her because under customary law no illegitimate child, not even a 
son, can inherit from the natural father. The Supreme Court of Appeal made much of this last 
point, agreeing with the reasoning of the court a quo and upholding the latter’s judgement in 
favour of Mr Letsela senior. 
All three judgements in the Mthembu case intimate a readiness to recognise the customary law 
of intestate succession, including those aspects of it that may be controversial measured 
against values enshrined – and rights entrenched – in the Constitution. In the first Mthembu 
judgement the Transvaal High Court, for instance, cited the constitutional entrenchment of the 
right to participate in a cultural life of one’s choice17 (section 31 of the transitional and section 
3018 of the final Constitution)19 as one of the constitutional indicia that the customary law of 
intestate succession passes constitutional muster.20 In the second judgement the High Court 
thought that an adaptation of the customary law of intestate succession to constitutional val-
ues is best left to parliament and that a court of law should not take such an exercise for its 
account.21 In the judgement on appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal per Mpati AJA inter alia 
had the following to say: 
“To strike down the rule [of male primogeniture under customary law] would be sum-
marily to dismiss an African institution without examining its essential purpose and 
content. ‘Decisions like these can seldom be taken on a mere handful of allegations in 
                                                 
15 Mthembu v Letsela and another 1997 2 SA 936 (T) (henceforth “the first Mthembu judgement”) 
and Mthembu v Letsela and another 1998 2 SA 675 (T) (henceforth “the second Mthembu judge-
ment”). 
16 Mthembu v Letsela and another 2000 3 SA 867 (SCA) (henceforth “the judgement on appeal”). 
17 944B-C; 945A. 
18 See 3 above. 
19 945A. 
20 946A. 
21 686H-687C. See also the judgement on appeal par 40 
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a pleading which only reflects the facts on which one of the contending parties relies’, 
per Hefer JA in Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 (1) SA 303 (A) 318 H.”22 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution enjoins a court interpreting legislation and developing the 
common law or customary law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in the Mthembu case, however, declined the invitation (sic!) of 
counsel for Ms Mthembu to develop the common law, holding that on the facts it was not an 
appropriate case for doing so: 
“[W]e would be ill-equipped to develop the rule for lack of relevant information. Any 
development of the rule would be better left to the legislature after a process of full in-
vestigation and consultation, such as is currently being undertaken by the Law Com-
mission.”23 
In sum, the three judgements in the Mthembu case lean towards a trusting recognition rather 
than a critical questioning of customary law, lest traditionalist lifestyles be dismissed in a 
high-handed, condescending manner. Values embodied and rights entrenched in the Constitu-
tion may be relied on, it would seem, to challenge (and strike down) precepts of customary 
law “so grossly unjust and abhorrent that it could not be countenanced”.24 Commentators have 
both criticised25 and commended26 this approach. If the acknowledgement of the otherness of 
the other(s) is an essential ingredient of integrating cultures, then generally speaking the 
courts’ attitude is to be commended. However, as Mpati AJA himself correctly points out in 
the judgement on appeal,27 the Mthembu case essentially deals with competing rights (not be-
tween the self and the other, but between two others), and therefore any judicial choice exer-
cised will inevitably compromise at least one (other) individual’s rights. That in the Mthembu 
case this individual had to be a minor black girl who would probably be left homeless as a re-
sult of the courts’ preference for customary law, goes to show how vital such choices are and 
how enormous the responsibility involved in making them is. There are, as a matter of fact, 
elements in the three Mthembu judgements that are premised on assumptions too glib duly to 
honour the enormity of the responsibility required for making the choices aforementioned. In 
the first judgement Le Roux J, for instance, intimated that the customary law of intestate suc-
cession, insofar as it encroaches on women’s right to equality, may be seen as a constitution-
ally passable limitation to the said right in terms of the general limitation clause in the Bill of 
Rights.28 This is his explanation: 
“There are other instances where a rule differentiates between men and women, but 
which no right-minded person considers to be unfairly discriminatory, for example the 
provision of separate toilet facilities.”29 
                                                 
22 Par 47 of the judgement on appeal. 
23 Par 40. 
24 The Mthembu judgement on appeal, professing to rely on Du Plessis and others v De Klerk and 
another 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) par 20. 
25 IP Maithufi “The Constitutionality of the Rule of Primogeniture in Customary Law of Intestate 
Succession. Mthembu v Letsela 1997 2 SA 935 (T)” Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 
61 (1998) 142-147. 
26 AJ Kerr “Inheritance in Customary Law under the Interim Constitution and under the present 
Constitution” The South African Law Journal 115 (1998) 262-270. 
27 Par 39. 
28 Section 33 of the transitional Constitution and section 36 of the 1996 Constitution. 
29 946B. 
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This is, to say the least, a feeble analogy given the gravity of the issues that had to be decided 
in the Mthembu case. 
From dicta in the first judgement30 as well as at least one dictum in the judgement on appeal it 
appears that the courts’ argumentation is, amongst others, premised on the assumption that 
blacks are subject to customary law of their own volition. Mpati AJA, for instance, says the 
following about a regulation that provides for the distribution, according to customary law, of 
the estates of blacks who die intestate: 
“What needs to be stressed from the outset is that the regulation in issue did not intro-
duce something foreign to Black persons…It merely gave legislative recognition to a 
principle or system which had been in existence and followed, at least, for decades. It 
is not inconceivable that many Blacks, even to this day, would wish their estates to de-
volve in terms of Black law and custom…The existing law…enables Blacks to avoid 
the consequences of the application of the customary law of succession if they so wish. 
It is therefore within the power of Blacks to choose how they wish their estates to de-
volve. If they take no steps to alter the devolution of their estates (as is their right), the 
resulting consequences cannot be assumed to be contrary to their wishes.” 
This (apparently reasonable) argumentation is flawed in three respects. First, the party “hard-
est hit” by the outcome of the Mthembu case is a minor girl unaware of any “choice” she “ex-
ercised” (or was supposed to exercise) to be subject to customary law. Second, the court’s as-
sumption as to what the late Mr Letsela might have had in mind, is but surmise and conjecture 
based solely on the court’s view of the preferences of a black person in Mr Letsela’s position. 
Outright non-recognition of customary law may amount to high-handed condescendence. As-
suming on behalf of (certain) black people that they wish to live by “their law” may be that 
very condescendence in reverse. Third, customary law, precisely because of its inherently 
“traditionalist” nature, is not static, but constantly grows and develops and is as a matter of 
fact particularly apt to development in accordance with section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
In short, the “over-recognition” of the customary law of intestate succession in the Mthembu 
case did customary law itself no good, for the three judgements all suggest that the application 
of customary law in this area and the effectual protection of fundamental rights entrenched in 
the Constitution are an either or: customary law can, by implication, not consistently be con-
strued in a manner promoting “the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. To be rec-
ognisable it must remain its primitive (?) self – tolerable, but not an indispensable ingredient 
of the living law of the nation taking its cue from values enshrined in the Constitution. It may 
well be that at the time when Mr Letsela died the law of the land other than customary law, 
that is the common law, had also not developed to the point where it could cater for intestate 
succession by an illegitimate child, but then it remains unfortunate that the three judgements 
in the Mthembu case created the impression that Thembi’s predicament stems from the appli-
cation of customary law. The constitutional injunction to develop customary law in accor-
dance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights is a way of integrating custom-
ary law with the “other law of the land” that stands to be developed in a similar manner. This 
needs not imply a simple equation of dissimilar modes of law whereby differences are denied. 
Customary law and common law can be developed in accordance with constitutional values 
each in its own way. Much meaningful is, for instance, to be said, in the light of the Bill of 
Rights, about a male heir’s responsibilities as successor to a deceased’s maintenance duties – 
                                                 
30 944B, 945A and 946A. 
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especially in instances where the rights and well-being of minors are at stake. This responsi-
bility is an essential element of the customary law rule of primogeniture and it makes good 
sense in a close-knit, small-scale rural community. What the position should be in an urban 
township is a question that has to be addressed through the development of the customary law 
on this point. 
A worrying aspect of the Mthembu case is that Thembi had to bear the brunt of illegitimacy 
while her parents all along intended to marry each other and had actually taken steps towards 
consummating a customary union the eventual completion of which was thwarted by the un-
timely death of Mr Letsela. Is there no room for the development of the customary law of 
marriage to cater for the rights and the interests (and especially the maintenance) of children 
born from a “union” in the process of being consummated? It must be borne in mind that the 
required payment of the dowry may delay the formal consummation of a union for a period 
during which, to all intents and purposes, the partners may consider themselves to be married. 
5 Religious diversity as cultural diversity 
The (free) exercise of religion often manifests itself as “culture” in the narrower (ethnic) 
sense.31 It is therefore not surprising that section 31(1)(a) of the Constitution mentions groups’ 
enjoyment of their culture, practise of their religion and use of their language in the same 
breath. I shall next assess some constitutional and legal means for the accommodation of re-
ligiously based manifestations of cultural diversity, and give some concrete examples of how 
the courts have invoked these means in concrete situations. 
5.1  The recognition of traditional and religious marriages 
Section 15(1) of the Constitution entrenches “the right to freedom of conscience, religion, 
thought, belief and opinion”. Section 15(3) thereupon states that the entrenchment of religious 
freedom does not prevent statutory recognition of either “marriages concluded under any tra-
dition, or a system of religious, personal or family law”32 or of the relevant system itself.33 No 
right is entrenched, however, and the envisaged legislation (which has not been enacted yet) 
will not automatically be exempt from constitutional challenges, for the actual statutory rec-
ognition of the marriages and the systems aforesaid is required to be consistent with section 
15 as a whole as well as with the rest of the Constitution. Section 15(3) caters for the concerns 
of certain religious minorities, but it is also a source of political controversy. Human rights 
activists (and feminists in particular) complain of the fact that some religious (just like some 
traditional34) systems of personal and family law discriminate against women.35 Section 15(3), 
so it is feared, will therefore not beget the advancement of the status of women in communi-
ties adhering to these discriminatory systems. 
                                                 
31 See 2 above. 
32 Section 15(3)(a)(i). 
33 Section 15(3)(a)(ii). 
34 See 4 above. 
35 Najma Moosa An Analysis of the Human Rights and gender Consequences of the new South Afri-
can Constitution and Bill of Rights with Regard to the Recognition and Implementation of Muslim 
Personal Law (MPL) LLD Thesis University of the Western Cape (Bellville 1997) however, con-
cludes that the recognition of, for instance, Muslim Personal Law subject to the Constitution is 
feasible, both theologically and from a human rights point of view, on the strength of the particular 
understanding of the teachings of Islam which she proposes. 
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Be it as it may, since the commencement of the transitional Constitution in 1994 some signifi-
cant case law on the recognition of religious marriages has called the conventional prejudices 
and a chronic intolerance towards some kinds of religious marriages into question, especially 
in instances where certain individual women (mostly Muslim widows) stood to benefit from a 
judicial approach more tolerant towards religious marriages. South African courts tradition-
ally held that marriages concluded in accordance with Muslim rites are polygamous and 
should therefore, on grounds of “public policy”, not enjoy legal recognition.36 It made no dif-
ference whether a marriage was in fact polygamous or not: the potential of a de facto mo-
nogamous union of becoming polygamous sufficed to attract the aversion of mainstream ju-
risprudence. Section 15(3) of the Constitution37 implicitly challenges this prejudice, but as 
was said previously, the legislative action authorised by that section has not been taken yet. 
In Ryland v. Edros,38 a case dealing with a divorced Muslim woman’s claim for (inter alia) 
maintenance, the Cape High Court held that the transitional Constitution had the effect of as-
suaging conventional prejudices about Muslim marriages, especially those marriages that are 
monogamous in fact. Traditionally a (potentially polygamous) Muslim marriage, on account 
of considerations of public policy, was not recognized officially. A wife to such a union could 
thus claim maintenance ex contractu but not ex lege from her husband. However, because the 
“contract of marriage” between a Muslim husband and wife conceivably violated the boni 
mores, any claim to maintenance (professing to be legally justified) was thought to be unen-
forceable.39 In Ryland v. Edros40 the court, however, held that constitutional values call into 
question a “public policy” that reflects the preferences and prejudices of only one (albeit a 
dominant) section of a plural society. 
Potentially Ryland v. Edros presented a step forward for widowed Muslim women. Under the 
South African law of delict the claim of the dependant can be brought against a perpetrator 
who intentionally or negligently killed a dependant’s “breadwinner.” The plaintiff must prove 
that the deceased had a legal duty (and not, for instance, merely a contractual obligation) to 
support him or her. The dependant’s claim has thus always been available to a spouse who 
was lawfully married under civil law and who had an ex lege right to support against the de-
ceased. However, a spouse who was married under Muslim law and whose marriage enjoyed 
no legal recognition only had a contractual right to support against the deceased, and this 
“weaker entitlement” precluded reliance on the dependant’s claim.41 
A veritable breakthrough for women thus disadvantaged was the unanimous judgement of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund.42 Not only 
did the court find that, in principle, someone who was a spouse to a Muslim marriage can 
                                                 
36 Elsje Bonthuys and Lourens du Plessis “Whither the Validity of Marriages concluded under a Sys-
tem of Religious Law under the Transitional Constitution. Kalla v The Master 1994 4 BCLR 
79(T)” SA Public Law 10 (1995) 200-210 at 201-202. 
37 Cf supra. 
38 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C). 
39 Ismail v. Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
40 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C) 91I, 92B, 92I-93B. 
41 This was held in a series of cases of which Seedat’s Executors v. The Master, 1917 A.D. 302 and 
Ismail v. Ismail, 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) were the leading ones. Section 31 of the Black Laws 
Amendment Act 76 of 1963 explicitly avails a (female) spouse to a black customary union, which 
also used to be no legally recognized marriage, of the dependant’s claim. 
42 1999 4 SA 1319 (SCA). 
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successfully invoke the dependant’s claim, but in doing so it explicitly refrained from consti-
tutionalising the issue.43 
Assessing the boni mores (“good morals”) in South Africa at the time when the plaintiff’s al-
leged cause of action arose (that is, the date on which her husband was killed, namely 25 July 
1993) the court concluded that a “new ethos” had by then “informed the determination of the 
boni mores of the community”.44 This ethos is substantially different to the one that spawned 
the traditional non-recognition of “potentially polygamous unions”. According to Mahomed 
CJ the political and constitutional changes that had taken place up to 25 July 1993, are all evi-
dence of the new ethos of “tolerance, pluralism and religious freedom”45 that admits of the le-
gal recognition of a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage for purposes of the defendant’s 
claim. 
5.2  Cultural idiosyncrasies in the practice of religion 
Legal and constitutional accommodation of a group’s – and especially a minority group’s - 
cultural distinctiveness becomes all the more controversial as the idiosyncrasy of its cultural 
practices increases and “the majority” perceives of such practices as immoral or even danger-
ous. We have seen this in South Africa too, especially in instances where cultural manifesta-
tions of some religious beliefs have challenged conventional wisdom of what is right and 
wrong, and of what is harmful to the public interest and what not. This wisdom may or may 
not be shared by the (f-)actual majority. It is enforced nonetheless because state institutions 
that wield the power of the sword accept its truth. 
One of the most difficult and controversial freedom of religion cases to have come before 
South African courts concerns the professional future of one Gareth Prince, a consumer of 
cannabis sativa (or “dagga” as it is known in South Africa) for spiritual, medicinal, culinary 
and ceremonial purposes as an integral part of practising his religion as Rastafarian. Prince 
successfully completed his legal studies to a point where, qualification-wise, he became eligi-
ble to be registered as a candidate attorney doing community service. He had twice been con-
victed of the statutory offence of possessing dagga, however, and this raised doubts as to 
whether he was a fit and proper person to be registered as a candidate attorney, especially in 
the light of his declared intention to continue using dagga. The Law Society of the Cape of 
Good Hope refused him registration whereupon he challenged the society’s decision in the 
Cape High Court.46 The court held that the statutory prohibition on the use of dagga was 
meant to protect public safety, order, health and morals and that these considerations out-
weighed (and thus limited) the right of Rastafarians to practice their religion through the use 
of dagga. The court thus refused to overturn the law society’s decision. 
Prince appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal47 which is South Africa’s court of final in-
stance in the adjudication of all but constitutional issues. His appeal was dismissed and he 
then lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court, the final court of appeal in constitutional 
matters. At the time of writing this paper, the Constitutional Court’s final judgement in this 
matter is still pending although the court has handed down quite a significant interim judge-
                                                 
43 Par 30 of the judgement. 
44 Par 21. 
45 Par 20. 
46 Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and others 1998 8 BCLR 976 (C). 
47 Prince v President, Cape Law Society and others 2000 3 SA 845 (SCA). 
Lourens Du Plessis, Perspectives of Integrating Different Cultures – Means of Law 
 15
ment that will be considered more fully below. But first some remarks about the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s judgement in the Prince case. This court’s mode of reasoning is suspect, 
irrespective of whether one agrees with the outcome of its decision. Overawed by the prospect 
of possibly admitting a dangerous dagga smoker to the distinguished ranks of the legal frater-
nity, the court paid little regard to what the right to free exercise of religion by a Rastafarian 
or, for that matter any other religious adherent, by definition entails. It limited the right before 
making an effort to determine its scope. This is a rights-unfriendly manner of dealing with 
fundamental rights. Prince is moreover not but an individual using dagga while on some crazy 
religious frolic of his own. He is a member of a denominational community that shares a par-
ticular belief on the use of dagga and that conducts an observance exposing its members, as a 
vulnerable minority, to both the manifest and hidden prejudices of a majority who condemns 
dagga smoking downright. This aspect of the case the Supreme Court of Appeal totally ig-
nores, but the Constitutional Court in its interim judgement48 does demonstrate an alertness to 
the dilemmas associable with Rastafarians’ minority position. 
The Constitutional Court concluded that neither the applicant nor the respondents in the 
Prince case had - in the course of the litigious process commencing in the Cape High Court - 
adduced sufficient evidence for a court finally to decide the crucial controversies involved in 
this case. From the applicant the court needed more evidence as to precisely how and in which 
circumstances Rastafarians smoke dagga as part of a religious observance, and as to what this 
observance precisely entails. From the respondents (which include the minister of justice and 
the director of public prosecutions in the Western Cape) the court required evidential elucida-
tion as to the practical difficulties that may be encountered should Rastafarians be allowed to 
acquire, possess and use dagga. Both sides were given the opportunity to adduce the required 
evidence and the case was postponed. This was something quite extraordinary for a final court 
of appeal to do, since parties are normally required to adduce all the necessary evidence at the 
time when an action is brought in the court of first instance (in this case the Cape High 
Court). It is only in rare circumstances that litigants are allowed to adduce additional evidence 
on appeal. The Constitutional Court, however, thought that such circumstances existed in the 
present case and some of the arguments advanced to reach this conclusion, show quite a pro-
found sensitivity not only to the applicant’s dilemma, but also to that of a minority religious 
community such as the Rastafarians.49 Such judicial responsiveness to the group and commu-
                                                 
48 Prince v President, Cap Law Society and others 2001 2 BCLR 133 (CC). 
49 The court per Ngcobo J made the following observations: 
 “The constitutional right to practise one’s religion asserted by the appellant here is of fundamental 
importance in an open and democratic society. It is one of the hallmarks of a free society…” (par 
25 of the judgement). 
 “[T]he appellant belongs to a minority group. The constitutional right asserted by the appellant 
goes beyond his own interest — it affects the Rastafari community. The Rastafari community is 
not a powerful one. It is a vulnerable group. It deserves the protection of the law precisely because 
it is a vulnerable minority. The very fact that Rastafari use cannabis exposes them to social stigma-
tisation. They are perceived as associated with drug abuse and their community is perceived as 
providing a haven for drug abusers and gangsters. During argument it was submitted on behalf of 
the A-G that if a religious exemption in favour of the Rastafari were to be allowed this would lead 
to an influx of gangsters and other drug abusers into their community. The assumption which this 
submission makes demonstrates the vulnerability of this group. Our Constitution recognises that 
minority groups may hold their own religious views and enjoins us to tolerate and protect such 
views. However, the right to freedom of religion is not absolute. While members of a religious 
community may not determine for themselves which laws they will obey and which they will not, 
Legal Policy Forum no. 6 
 16
nal concerns involved in cultural manifestations of the right to freedom of religion, coming 
from of South Africa’s highest court in constitutional matters as it were, bodes well for the 
onset of a constitutional jurisprudence sensitive to the vulnerability of (eccentric) cultural and 
religious minorities in society. 
However, a similar judicial responsiveness is by and large absent from two of the three 
judgements handed down in Bührmann v Nkosi and another50 in the Transvaal Provincial Di-
vision of the High Court as well as in the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgement on appeal 
(Nkosi and another v Bührmann51). Ms Nkosi, a widow, lived on Mr Bührmann’s farm from 
1966 to 1981 with her late husband and their children and again from 1987 onwards with two 
of her sons. Mr Bührmann took charge of the farming operations in 1970 from his father 
(Bührmann senior). Ms Nkosi’s husband was employed as a labourer on the farm between 
1966 and 1981 whereupon he moved to another farm with his family. He passed away in 
1986. Ms Nkosi returned to Mr Bührmann’s farm in 1987 and continued to live there with the 
latter’s permission. When the Extension of Security of Tenure Act52 came into operation on 
28 November 1997 Ms Nkosi (in terms of the act) acquired the status of an “occupier” of the 
land where she lived and together with that a number of rights specifically provided for in the 
act. Among these rights are the right to reside on and use the land53 as well as the rights (as 
occupier) to a family life in accordance with the culture of the family54 and freedom of relig-
ion, belief, opinion and expression.55 The right of any person (and not only an occupier) to 
visit and maintain family graves on land that belongs to another person is also guaranteed, but 
the owner of the land may impose such conditions as are reasonable “to safeguard life or 
property or to prevent the undue disruption of work on the land”.56 
Ms Nkosi’s son, Petrus, who was born on the Bührmann farm in 1968, died in 1999 and Mr 
Bührmann refused Ms Nkosi permission to bury her son on the farm where she and the said 
son had been living legally. Mr Bührmann approached the High Court in Pretoria for an order 
prohibiting the burial, but a single judge (Cassim AJ) refused the order. Mr Bührmann then 
successfully appealed to a full bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court 
whereupon Ms Nkosi unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Only the 
judgements handed down by the full bench and by the Supreme Court of Appeal have been 
reported and they are the judgements considered in the discussion. 
Ms Nkosi’s case was that she had a right to bury her son on the farm. First, she alleged that in 
1968 when one of her grandsons died, he was buried on a piece of land pointed out by Mr 
Bührmann senior for that purpose (and subsequently set aside for family burials). Second, Ms 
Nkosi relied on her right to freedom of religion and belief alleging that according to her cus-
tom and religious belief a family member who passes away is only physically but not also 
spiritually separated from those who are left behind. Such a deceased should therefore be bur-
ied in a place where the surviving family members can communicate spiritually with him or 
                                                                                                                                                        
the state should, where it is reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting the believers to a choice be-
tween their faith and respect for the law” (par 26 of the judgement). 
50 2001 1 SA 1145 (T). 
51 SCA case no 1/2000; judgement delivered on 25 September 2001. 
52 62 of 1997. 
53 Section 6(1) of the act. 
54 Section 6(2)(d). 
55 Section 5(d). 
56 Section 6(4). 
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her on a daily basis. The late Mr Nkosi and his mother performed the rituals necessary to de-
clare and introduce the piece of land pointed out by Mr Bührmann senior as such an “official 
home for the ancestors”. The late Mr Nkosi himself was not buried there because at the time 
of his death the family was living on another farm and they encountered transport difficulties 
that made it impossible to hold Mr Nkosi’s funeral on the Bührmann farm. 
In essence then the issue in the Nkosi case was how to weigh Ms Nkosi’s right to her religious 
beliefs against Mr Bührmann’s right (of ownership) to his land. Apart from the unreported 
judgement of Cassim AJ, four judgments were written in this case: three by judges of the 
Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court and one by Howie JA on behalf of an unani-
mous Supreme Court of Appeal. Three of these judgements (two in the court a quo and the 
judgment on appeal) lent precedence to Bührmann’s right of ownership to his land above Ms 
Nkosi’s right to her religious beliefs. The assumptions underlying the line of reasoning in 
these judgments is succinctly stated by Howie JA (in the judgement on appeal) as follows: 
“My conclusion, therefore, is that the right to freedom of religion and religious practice 
has internal limits. It does not confer unfettered liberty to choose a grave site nor does 
it include the right to take a grave site without the consent of the owner of the land 
concerned. It follows that s 5(d) of the Act does not, when viewed in isolation, confer 
the right which the appellant claims.”57 
Satchwell J, in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court, voiced a similar senti-
ment and explained her preferences in some detail: 
“The Constitution clearly envisages that the second respondent [Ms Nkosi] is free to 
hold and act upon her religious convictions and that she is not to be interfered with or 
discriminated against in regard thereto. However, we were referred to no authority and 
I know of none which imposes on a private individual a positive obligation to promote 
the religious practices and beliefs of another at one's own expense. If such were envis-
aged either by the Constitution or the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, each occu-
pier who professed a religion or set of beliefs would be entitled to require of the land-
owner that he permit the erection of a church or tabernacle or other place of worship 
on his land in circumstances where the occupier's religion required adherents to gather 
together with symbols of faith in an enclosed building. Conceivably, the landowner 
could be obliged to make separate allocations of land for such purposes in respect of 
each denomination or sect or religion professed by individual occupiers. 
Freedom of religion, belief and opinion, no less than other rights, must be exercised 
within the parameters of the Constitution and in the present case where reliance is 
placed upon s 5 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act.”58 
This seems to be a rather reasonable way of approaching the matter, but on closer analysis it 
gives rise to at least one critical question: why is Ms Nkosi’s right to religion and belief from 
the outset looked upon as a right that is (and has to be) limited, but Mr Bührmann’s entitle-
ment to his property, which does not enjoy outright protection as a constitutional right, is not 
limited in a similar manner? The South African Constitution does not protect or entrench 
property rights as constitutional (or public law) rights. Property rights enjoy protection as pri-
vate law rights under the common law. Section 25 of the Constitution guarantees a “due proc-
                                                 
57 Par 49. 
58 1155D-F. 
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ess of law” (meeting certain specified requirements) in instances where property (and rights to 
property) are diminished or taken. 
Ngoepe JP in his (dissenting) minority judgement in the Transvaal Provincial Division inti-
mated that the constitutional recognition of a right to freedom of religion and belief is not 
worth much if it does not include an entitlement to practise out or materialise the protected re-
ligion and belief:59 
“It is well known that there is a strong relationship between people's religion and the 
way in which, in the manifestation of such a belief, they would want their dead to be 
buried. For example, one religion requires that the dead be buried within a certain pe-
riod; practitioners of another conventional religion demand that their dead be buried 
with their heads facing to the west in anticipation of the great day of re-awakening. All 
these are manifestations of certain religions and beliefs, apparently aimed at helping 
the deceased achieve a better hereafter life or world. To acknowledge the respondent's 
right to practice and manifest her religion, but bar her from interring her son at a place 
and in a manner that would give meaning to her right of religion and belief could 
amount to no more than paying mere lip service to such a right. 
The difficulty in the present case is that the manifestation of the respondent's religion 
and belief, in the form of the burial of her son on the farm, would constitute an en-
croachment on the owner's right of ownership. But ss 5 and 6, as well as other sections 
of the Act, are specifically aimed at making some inroad into that right. The parties' 
competing rights must therefore be weighed against each other: It cannot be reasonably 
expected that the respondent exhumes the seven already buried to go and found a new 
‘home’; there is already an area for burial; other employees of the respondent bury on 
that farm with the appellant's permission; the area the appellant loses to the grave is 
probably 1 m by 2 m; and, apparently in terms of the law as it stands, the respondent 
will in any case still be entitled to visit the existing seven graves. I am not persuaded 
that the loss of a 1 m by 2 m area constitutes such a drastic curtailment of the appel-
lant's right of ownership as to justify denying the respondent the right I have already 
described in detail.”60 
Ngoepe JP’s approach distinguishes itself from those of the other judges in really weighing 
Bührmann’s and Nkosi’s rights against each other accepting that the rights involved on both 
sides are (at least) equally limitable. He does not proceed on the assumption that someone’s 
right to religious beliefs and the entitlement to perform the rituals associated with those be-
liefs are, in principle, second to someone else’s entitlement to his or her property. Such an ap-
proach is significant for the effectual acknowledgement, in legal terms, of the others’ culture, 
taking into account that, under the apartheid system, black people living and working on 
white farms were, in their day to day lives and in their self-expression of a lifestyle, to a large 
extent at the mercy of farm owners. The relationship between farm owners and black people 
living on their land very much resembled the relationship between the feudal lords of old and 
their vassals. 
                                                 
59 1160F-H. 
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6 Concluding observations 
If someone were to look at the constitutional, statutory and case law examples I discuss in this 
paper, (s)he may be tempted to conclude that I have not dealt with means of law designed to 
facilitate the integration of different cultures, but rather their separation. That would be a su-
perficial reading of my argumentation, though. I certainly cherish the idea of nation building 
and will devote all my energy and expertise to co-operate with like-minded compatriots in 
putting the idea to practice and in relying on all practicable means, including legal and consti-
tutional measures, in quest of doing so. However, the ideal will remain unfulfilled, I believe, 
if the law and the Constitution are invoked, in a strong arm fashion, trying to effect the inte-
gration of the different cultures in South Africa by concocting a melting pot. The law and the 
Constitution can do no more than to aid the facilitation of a process of consolidation as pre-
condition to nation building, and this process will fail if the reality of deep-seated, cultural 
differences among various sections of the population are denied or simply thought away. 
These differences should actively be acknowledged instead, showing each and every individ-
ual South African that South Africa is home to her or him as (s)he is, and that there is no 
blueprint-like assertion of her or his humanness that preconditions full access to the entitle-
ments of South African citizenship. 
Loyalty to a nation, just like charity, begins at home with the more immediate and intimate 
expression of citizens’ humanness in day-to-day life. From this point of departure it makes 
sense to negotiate (as we in South Africa have done) and participate in realising (as most of us 
are hopefully doing) a legal and constitutional dispensation that unite all citizens in at least re-
specting (but hopefully also valuing) the otherness of the other(s). If we do this we can also 
all start celebrating our diversity in concert and yet each one (and each group) in her or his (or 
its) distinctive way. This is the stuff that a nation is made of; this is the soil in which a com-
mon loyalty (and devotion) to a country grows - among people and peoples as diverse as the 
people and peoples of South Africa. 
In short, we in South Africa have lived through the dismal failure of a system that tried to 
force cultural segregation upon people, and we are still to a large extent left carrying the can 
of this failure. However, the lesson to be learnt from our failure is not simply that a forced 
segregation of cultures is futile (which of course it is), but that culture as a dynamic reality is 
spectacularly ill at ease in any straitjacket – that of forced segregation as much as that of 
forced integration. 
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